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Meaningful Mutations:
Reflections on the Synchronicity of Evolution
Ritske Rensma

University College Roosevelt
Utrecht, Netherlands
Although Jung made a connection between his concept of the archetype and mankind’s
evolutionary history throughout his career, he remained notoriously tight-lipped about his
own specific views on evolutionary theory. In the final years of his life, however, he finally
went more into detail about this important topic, putting forward a most thought-provoking
idea: the notion that synchronicity, or meaning ful coincidences, had a role to play in the way
evolution took shape. As I will argue in this paper, Jung’s comments on this topic present
clear evidence that he did not think primarily along Darwinian lines, as has recently been
claimed; rather, I will argue that he adopted what Wolfgang Pauli referred to as a third
position—one that goes beyond both Darwinism and Lamarckism. This third position is
strongly informed by the notion that evolutionary changes are not random but meaningful,
and that synchronicity has a role to play in the way evolution takes shape. This suggests that
Jung is not so much a kindred spirit to Neo-Darwinian evolutionary psychologists, but a
thinker who is much closer in his intuitions and affinities to several evolutionary thinkers
who have been influential in the field of transpersonal psychology, most notably Ken Wilber.
Keywords: C.G. Jung, Wolfgang Pauli, synchronicity, evolutionary theory, archetype,
Darwin, Neo-Darwinism, Lamarck, transpersonal psychology, chaos theory,
complexity, Ken Wilber, pre-trans fallacy, Mercurius, alchemical hermeneutics

I

n his foreword to Jung and the Postmodern (Hauke,
2000), Jung scholar Andrew Samuels noted that
in the fifteen years which preceded the book’s
publication something remarkable had happened:
the field of post-Jungian studies had quietly gathered
momentum and gained acceptance in the wider academic
community. Samuels (2000) even went as far as to label
this development “Jung’s return from banishment”
(p. xi), and claimed that this time around, a reexamination of Jung’s core ideas was taking place:
Over the last fifteen years I have been involved in
the publication of around fifty-five volumes for
Routledge which, it is generally agreed, cluster at
the "academic", "demanding" and "critical" end
of the range of analytical psychology and Jungian
analysis. Over the same period, observers of the
Jungian analytic and psychoanalytic scenes have
noted in academic quarters and in intellectual life
in general what has been termed Jung's return from
banishment. Some of this re-examination of Jung

and his work rests in a clearer understanding of the
globally damning way in which it was dealt with by
the psychoanalytic establishment. Some of it is due
to the quiet penetration of a number of academic
fields by those with knowledge of Jungian ideas
and a desire to apply these ideas in their fields of
interest and expertise. … Further re-examination
stems from a recognition that comparisons between
Jung's work and that of other writers or movements
are much more substantial and important than we
thought before and can no longer be disregarded if
we are to retain any sort of academic and intellectual
openness. (Samuels, 2000, p. xi)
Now, roughly fifteen years later, this reexamination of Jung’s work shows no signs of abating.
There have been a string of books and articles that
highlight connections between Jung’s ideas and more
recent intellectual developments, often claiming that
Jung was a precursor of these developments in some
way and deserves more credit for this than he has thus
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far received. An aspect of Jung’s theoretical framework
that has received considerable attention in this regard
is his concept of the archetype, which a large number
of authors have re-examined in light of more recent
scientific developments. The work of Jungian analyst
Anthony Stevens has been particularly influential in this
context, who makes the case in his books Archetype (1982)
and Archetype Revisited (2002) that what is arguably Jung’s
most important hypothesis was in many ways ahead of its
time. Stevens (2002) himself put it as follows:
For most of the twentieth century it was fashionable
to focus on environmental influences and to ignore
the hereditary ones. This is one reason why Jung’s
theory of archetypes, which postulated innate
structures, was ignored or rejected. Now that
hereditary forces are receiving as much attention
as environmental factors, evidence is accumulating
that Jung was right. (p. xii)
Stevens was among the first to point out that
many contemporary thinkers who theorize about the
psyche from an evolutionary perspective are defending
positions that are highly similar to Jung’s position,
and he has done extensive work on highlighting
the similarities between Jung’s ideas and recent
developments in evolutionary psychology, psychiatry,
sociology, and anthropology. Other scholars who have
made connections between the concept of the archetype
and more recent scientific ideas and concepts are—
amongst others—Walters (1994), McDowell (2001),
Knox (2002), MacLennan (2006), Merchant (2009),
Haule (2010b), and Goodwyn (2010).
A commonly held outlook which has emerged
as a result of this scientific re-examination of the concept
of the archetype is that this concept is fully in line
with recent Neo-Darwinian theories about the innate
strucutres of the mind. Stevens is one of the most wellknown defenders of this position. At first glance, this
interpretation of Jung’s ideas may have some appeal, as
it is certainly true that many neo-Darwinian thinkers
end up making statements which sound remarkably
similar to statements made by Jung. Take, for example,
the following passage from the work of Cosmides and
Tooby (1997), two highly influential scholars in the field
of evolutionary psychology:
[Evolutionary psychology] is not an area of study,
like vision, reasoning, or social behavior. It is a way

62

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

of thinking about psychology that can be applied to
any topic within it. In this view, the mind is a set of
information-processing machines that were designed
by natural selection to solve adaptive problems faced
by our hunter-gatherer ancestors. (n.p.)
It is certainly true that one can find similarsounding passages in the Collected Works with ease, for
example this one:
[There] are many things in the human psyche that
were never acquired by the individual, for the human
mind is not born a tabula rasa, nor is every man provided with a wholly new and unique brain. He is
born with a brain that is the result of development
in an endlessly long chain of ancestors. . . . All those
factors, therefore, that were essential to our near
and remote ancestors will also be essential to us, for
they are embedded in the inherited organic system.
(Jung, 1927/1931, para. 717)
Despite these surface similarities, however,
claiming that Jung’s concept of the archetype is fully
compatible with such modern neo-Darwinian ideas is
not without its problems. The most important reason for
this is that there are also many passages in the Collected
Works in which Jung seems to make use of a competing
evolutionary theory to Darwinism: Lamarckism. This
evolutionary theory, which is based on the notion that socalled acquired characteristics are hereditary and passed
on to future generations, is nowadays largely discredited,
and the fact that passages exist in the Collected Works
that have a Lamarckian feel has been used by scholars
critical of Jung to argue that his theoretical framework
is methodologically unsound. Several authors have,
however, argued along a similar line as Stevens has in
recent years: that Jung’s ideas about evolution can, in
fact, be interpreted without friction as compatible with
Neo-Darwinian thought. Claims to this effect have been
made by Samuels (1985), Clarke (1992), Palmer (1997),
and Hogenson (2001).1
Apart from Jung’s ideas about the concept of
the archetype and his views on evolution, a third area
of focus has emerged in recent Jungian scholarship that
seeks to re-examine Jung’s ideas in light of modern
scientific developments: Jung’s concept of synchronicity,
or meaningful coincidences (a better and subtler definition
of this concept is possible and will follow in the pages
to come). As has happened with Jung’s concept of the
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archetype, a variety of scholars have argued that Jung
was ahead of his time in many ways with this concept,
and have highlighted the similarities and connections
to more recent developments. Joseph Cambray, for
example, has done important work that compares Jung’s
ideas about synchronicity to recent developments in
chaos and complexity theory—his book Synchronicity:
Nature and Psyche in an Interconnected Universe (2009)
is probably the best introduction to this particular
topic. Several scholars have also focused on making
connections between the synchronicity concept and
recent developments in physics: Mansfield (1995), Card
(1991), Duch (2002), and Haule (2010a) have all done
extensive work in this area. Further connections have
been made between the synchronicity concept and the
fields of religious studies (Main, 2007a), psychotherapy
(Main, 2007b), and biology (Haule, 2010a).
It is safe to say, then, that Jung’s concept of the
archetype, his ideas about evolution, and his concept of
synchronicity have all received considerable attention
from the scholarly community interested in re-examining
his work in the manner described by Samuels. What has
gone almost completely unnoticed, however, is that Jung
himself made a connection between all of these topics.
Synchronicity, as Jung came to conclude towards the end
of his life, has a role to play in the process of evolution,
thus making evolution a meaningful process as opposed
to a random one, as the Neo-Darwinians hold. Jung only
mentions what I will call the evolution-synchronicity
connection in a single letter, written on the 10th of
March 1959 to his friend Erich Neumann. In this letter
he described this connection as follows:
It staggers the mind even to begin to imagine the
accidents and hazards that, over millions of years,
transformed a lemurlike tree-dweller into a man. In
this chaos of chance, synchronistic phenomena were
probably at work, operating both with and against
the known laws of nature to produce, in archetypal
moments, syntheses which appear to us miraculous.
(Jung, 1973b, pp. 494-495)
Even though the letter was not published during
Jung’s life, it has now been in publication for a long
time, as it was included in volume two of the collection
of letters that was published after his death. Yet despite
its importance for shedding light on Jung’s exact views
about evolution, its existence has gone almost entirely
unnoticed. The only scholars I am aware of who reference
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the letter in an academic publication are Cambray (2002,
2009), Maine (2004), and Donati (2004). All three,
however, only devoted a limited amount of attention to
it, and did not reflect in great detail on its implications.
Cambray and Maine—both influential and widely
read interpreters of Jung’s synchronicity concept—have
offered some short reflections, but in publications that
do not have Jung’s views on evolutionary theory as their
sole point of focus. Their attention, then, is by necessity
on other topics, which means that the views expressed by
Jung in the Neumann letter represent at the moment a
thoroughly under-researched aspect of Jung’s theoretical
framework.
In this article I will attempt to correct this
imbalance. After laying the groundwork in section
one, in which I will examine Jung’s general ideas about
synchronicity in some detail, I will zoom in on the
Neumann letter, analyzing it closely to try and tease
out its exact meaning and implications. Given the fact
that Jung had so little to say on the synchronicity–
evolution connection—only one letter, with only two
passages in the letter dealing specifically with evolution
and synchronicity—this is not an easy task. Luckily
enough, a collection of texts exists that is highly relevant
to shedding light on this subject matter: the writings
on evolutionary theory by Wolfgang Pauli, the Nobelprize winning physicist with whom Jung collaborated
intensively in order to fine-tune his ideas about
synchronicity. Pauli became heavily interested in biology
under the influence of quantum physicist Niels Bohr, who
was writing about this topic as early as the 1930s.2 In the
1940s, Pauli became especially interested in evolutionary
theory, which he began researching intensively, as his
letters reveal.3 Unlike Jung, however, Pauli wrote about
evolutionary theory extensively, primarily in elaborate
letters to other physicists. He also published an article
in an academic journal in which the topic is discussed:
“Naturwissenschaftliche und Erkenntnistheoretische
Aspekte der Ideen vom Unbewussten,” published in the
journal Dialectica in December, 1954 to commorate
Jung’s 80th birthday.4 In all of these texts Pauli made
claims about evolution that are virtually identical to
the views Jung expresses in the Neumann letter. Pauli,
however, went much more into depth, and explained
his views much more clearly. This makes his work an
excellent tool to help clarify Jung’s views.
After a close analysis of the Neumann letter, I
will deal with its implications for locating Jung in the
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wider spectrum of existing evolutionary theories, in the
final section of this paper. To my mind, the letter presents
clear evidence that Jung did not think solely along
Darwinian lines, as has recently been claimed. Although
there is strong evidence that he sometimes thought along
Lamarckian lines, the Neumann letter shows quite clearly
that labeling Jung a Lamarckian does not cover his actual
position accurately either. Rather, I will argue that Jung
adopted what Pauli (1953/2002) referred to as a "third
position" (p. 130)—one that goes beyond both Darwinism
and Lamarckism. This third position is informed strongly
by the notion that evolutionary changes are not random
but meaningful, and that synchronicity has a role to play
in the way evolution takes shape. As I will argue, this
means that Jung is not so much a kindred spirit to NeoDarwinian evolutionary psychologists but a thinker who
is much closer in his intuitions and affinities to several
evolutionary thinkers who have been influential in the
field of transpersonal psychology, most notably Ken
Wilber. I will finish the paper by pointing out some of
these similarities, and by making connections to a wider
debate within the field of transpersonal psychology, the
so-called pre-trans fallacy debate.
Jung’s Synchronicity Project:
Key Definitions and Core Ideas
he synchronicity concept is very much a late
development in Jung’s overall intellectual history.
Even though there are orientating intuitions in his
early works, the most important published texts about
this topic were all written by Jung when he was in his
eighties. His first published work which deals solely with
the synchronicity concept was the transcription of a talk
he gave at the Eranos conference, which is published as
part of volume 8 of the Collected Works under the title
“On Synchronicity” (1951). Jung’s most important work
on the topic, however, is the article “Synchronicity: An
A-causal Connecting Principle” (1952), first published
as part of a book he co-wrote with Pauli entitled The
Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche (Jung & Pauli,
1952/1955). It has also been included in volume 8 of the
Collected Works. The definition of synchronicity that Jung
(1952) offered at the start of this article is the following:
“[The] simultaneous occurrence of a certain psychic
state with one or more external events which appear as
meaningful parallels to the momentary subjective state”
(para. 850). In order to illustrate what he meant by this,
he offered the following example:

T
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A young woman I was treating had, at a critical
moment, a dream in which she was given a golden
scarab. While she was telling me this dream I sat
with my back to the closed window. Suddenly I
heard a noise behind me, like a gentle tapping. I
turned round and saw a flying insect knocking
against the window-pane from outside. I opened
the window and caught the creature in the air as it
flew in. It was the nearest analogy to a golden scarab
that one finds in our latitudes, a scarabaeid beetle,
the common rose-chafer (Cetonia aurata), which
contrary to its usual habits had evidently felt an urge
to get into a dark room at this particular moment.
(Jung, 1952, para. 843).
In this example, what Jung (1952) referred to
in his definition as ‘‘the simultaneous occurrence of a
certain psychic state with one or more external events”
(para. 850) is represented by the parallelism between
the woman telling Jung of her dream about the golden
scarab (the psychic state) and the beetle flying in through
the window (the external event). What makes this a
case of synchronicity is that the two events (the psychic
and the external event), as Jung (1952) put it, “appear
as meaningful parallels” (par. 850) to one another. In
other words: this is a case of a meaningful coincidence,
with meaningful referring to the fact that there was a
striking similarity in content between the two events. In
this example, the similarity in content is very literal: the
woman literally dreamed of an animal that very closely
resembled the animal that actually flew in through the
window. In one of his letters, Jung (1973a) gave another
example of such a literal case of similarity in meaning:
a female patient was telling him about a dream she
had in which a fox was involved, just as an actual fox
appeared on the forest path along which she and Jung
were walking (p. 395).
Another example given by Jung in his main
synchronicity essay to illustrate the concept is the
following one:
I should like to mention another case that is typical
of a certain category of events. The wife of one of
my patients, a man in his fifties, once told me in
conversation that, at the deaths of her mother and her
grandmother, a number of birds gathered outside the
windows of the death-chamber. I had heard similar
stories from other people. When her husband's
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treatment was nearing its end, his neurosis having
been cleared up, he developed some apparently
quite innocuous symptoms which seemed to me,
however, to be those of heart-disease. I sent him
along to a specialist, who after examining him told
me in writing that he could find no cause for anxiety.
On the way back from this consultation (with the
medical report in his pocket) my patient collapsed in
the street. As he was brought home dying, his wife
was already in a great state of anxiety because, soon
after her husband had gone to the doctor, a whole
flock of birds alighted on their house. She naturally
remembered the similar incidents that had happened
at the death of her own relatives, and feared the
worst. (Jung, 1952, par. 844)
Here the appearance of the birds is meaningful in
a somewhat different way than the appearance of the beetle
was meaningful: the birds are symbolically meaningful.
There is no literal similarity in content between the
arrival of the birds and the death of the husband, as
with the scarab and the arrival of the beetle. Rather, a
symbolic connection exists. As Jung (1952) pointed out in
“Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle,” birds
are often used as a symbol of the soul in a mythological
context (para. 845); the flock of birds, therefore, could be
interpreted as a death symbol, pointing to the departure of
the soul from the body and by extension also to the death
of the husband. If one looks closely at this second example,
there is another important difference between this case
and that of the scarab. In that case, there was clearly a
simultaneous parallel between an external and a psychic
event. Here, however, no reference seems to be made to a
psychic state at all—rather, there seems to be a meaningful
connection between two external events: the death of the
husband, and the alighting of the birds on the house.
Jung (1952) clarified, however, that the psychic event in
this case was an unconscious one: the wife must have had
some sort of unconscious premonition of the husband’s
death beforehand, and it was to this unconscious psychic
state that the arrival of the birds is related as a “meaningful
parallelism” (para. 850). Because Jung stressed in his
definition of synchronicity given above that the parallel in
meaning must occur simultaneously, one must conclude
that the woman had this unconscious premonition at the
exact same moment the birds alighted on her house. This
is indeed what Jung (1952) himself claimed in the text in
which he brought up this example (para. 850).
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Both examples contain important differences
from one another, then: on the one hand, between a
literal parallelism in content and a symbolic parallelism
in content, and on the other hand between the
involvement of conscious and unconscious psychic
content. What connects the two examples, and what
Jung (1952) stressed in both cases, was that a pattern
of order and meaning was to be observed, so much so
that he felt that it was wrong to dismiss the examples
as mere chance. This is typical of synchronistic events
in general, according to Jung’s definition: he saw them
as a parallelism between a psychic and external event
that appeared to be meaningful. For this reason, Jung
(1952) also referred to synchronicity as “meaningful
parallelism” (para. 850) and “meaningful orderedness”
(para. 948). Jung (1952) eventually came to conclude
that the meaning observable in synchronistic events is
not created by the observer of these events (para. 915).
Many people think of meaning as something that human
beings create themselves: we give the world its meaning
by interpreting it and filtering it through our values and
norms. Jung (1952), however, came to conclude that
synchronistic events offer evidence that meaning also
exists independent of human observation (para. 915).
The arrival of the beetle, for example, was meaningful
in and of itself—it was not merely meaningful because
Jung and his patient deemed it to be so. Meaning, in this
view, is not just something human beings create through
their conscious interpretation of the world around them;
rather, it also exists on an a priori level, and for that reason
Jung (1952) also referred to the meaning that emerges
in synchronistic events as “transcendental” (para. 915).
It is this notion of a transcendental, absolute meaning
that Jung saw as operational in the process of evolution,
driving it forward in such a way that the creativity
inherent in it was not blind and random at all, as the
Darwinist thinkers have been claiming for over a century
now. It is to that topic that the paper will now turn.5
Jung and Pauli on the Relationship Between
Synchronicity and Evolution
ung was very hesitant to describe, in detail, what
his ideas were about evolutionary theory. He
frequently asserted that he thought the archetypes of
the collective unconscious were related to mankind’s
evolutionary history, but he almost never went into
detail about to which particular theory of evolution
he subscribed.6 Although he was frequently accused of
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Lamarckism, there is no reference at all to either Lamarck
or Lamarckism in the entirety of the Collected Works.
Jung was also rather notably silent about Darwin and
Darwinism. He discussed Darwin’s ideas only twice in
the Collected Works: once in Psychological Types (Jung,
1921/1960, para. 632), where he used Darwin as an
example of an extraverted-thinking type, and once in in
an article from 1928 called On Psychic Energy, where he
discussed someone else’s interpretation of Darwin, not
his own (para. 48). Evolution, then, appears to be a topic
about which Jung did not feel compelled to speculate
in great detail in his public writings. Nevertheless, if
one examines Jung's writings carefully, it is certainly
possible to tease out the outlines of his core ideas about
this important subject. Many of the passages that allow
one to do this are, in my opinion, clearly Lamarckian in
nature. With Lamarckian I do not mean a theory which
is completely identical with that of Lamarck himself;
rather, I use it in the general sense, as a theory subscribing
to the idea that acquired characteristics can be inherited.
Many passages in Jung's work clearly subscribe to this
idea. Jung frequently claimed, for example, that the
archetypes exist because the experiences of our ancestors
have left an imprint on the innate base of the psyche, for
example when he wrote the following:
[The archetype] can be conceived as a mnemic
deposit, an imprint or engram (Semon), which
has arisen through the condensation of countless
processes of a similar kind. In this respect it is a
precipitate and, therefore, a typical basic form, of
certain ever¬recurring psychic experiences. (Jung,
1921/1960, par. 748)
Jung made similar claims throughout his career.
Although it has been argued that Jung used terms
such as imprints and deposits figuratively (Stevens,
2002, p. 76), and that he did not actually believe in
the fact that acquired characteristics such as imprints
could be inherited, I believe that there is more than
enough evidence to suggest that Jung most definitely
believed in the inheritance of acquired characteristics
(for an overview of this evidence, see Rensma, 2013).
Nevertheless, I believe there is also clear evidence that
Jung did not think only along Lamarckian lines, and that
he also sometimes adopted a theoretical position that
comes much closer to Darwinism. Jung, for example,
frequently stated that he believed that consciousness
arose in human beings because it gave our ancestors
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an evolutionary advantage—an idea that has much
more in common with Darwin's ideas than it does with
Lamarck's.7 As Hogenson (2001) has shown, it is also
an established fact that he was influenced by a number
of Neo-Darwinian thinkers, most notably James Mark
Baldwin and Conway Lloyd Morgan.
Jung, then, appears not to have been a staunch
Lamarckian, nor was he the Darwinian some Jungians
have tried to turn him into. Rather, as befitted his
eclectic character, he borrowed from both, illuminating
his subject matter by drawing on theories resembling
both Lamarck's and Darwin's depending on the
context. As has been pointed out in the introduction
of this paper, however, a third line of influence on
Jung's thinking about evolution should be mentioned
alongside the ideas of Darwin and Lamarck: his own
concept of synchronicity. To the best of my knowledge,
not a single passage in the Collected Works deals with this
subject, which leads me to think that Jung did not feel
comfortable discussing it in public. In private, however,
Jung sometimes dropped his guard about topics about
which he kept silent in public. For that reason, his
letters can be a very rewarding source of information
regarding some of his more controversial ideas. This
is also the case for his ideas about the link between
synchronicity and evolution. In the letter to Erich
Neumann from 1959 mentioned in the introduction,
Jung discussed not only his ideas about evolution in
some detail, but also linked these ideas very distinctly
to his ideas about synchronicity. I will not include the
complete letter here—it can be found in its entirety
in volume two of Jung’s published letters (1973b, pp.
494-495) and in Roderick Main’s Jung on Synchronicity
and the Paranormal (1997). Rather, I will only offer the
two sections of the letter that are most relevant to the
present discussion. To allow for a clearer discussion
afterwards, I have labeled these two sections Fragment
one and Fragment two; in the letter itself, these appear
in succession, though not contiguously.
Fragment one.
It staggers the mind even to begin to imagine the
accidents and hazards that, over millions of years,
transformed a lemurlike tree-dweller into a man. In
this chaos of chance, synchronistic phenomena were
probably at work, operating both with and against
the known laws of nature to produce, in archetypal
moments, syntheses which appear to us miraculous.
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Fragment two.
The essential thing about [synchronistic] phenomena
is that an objective event coincides meaningfully
with a psychic process; that is to say, a physical event
and an endopsychic one have a common meaning.
This presupposes not only an all-pervading, latent
meaning which can be recognized by consciousness,
but, during that preconscious time, a psychoid
process with which a physical event meaningfully
coincides. (Jung, 1973b, pp. 494-495)
One can first reflect on what Jung did not
mention in this letter: a clear mechanism to account for
evolution. He did not mention natural selection (one
such mechanism); nor did he mention the Lamarckian
mechanism of the inheritance of acquired characteristics.
He did, however, describe evolution as a process consisting
of countless “accidents and hazards,” a veritable “chaos
of chance.” At the very least, this allows the hypothesis
that Jung may have been thinking in terms of Darwinian
natural selection here. After all, it is very much the
case that “accidents and hazards” are the driving force
behind Darwin’s concept of natural selection. Random
mutations give rise to organisms with new features; if
these new features turn out to give the organism an
environmental advantage, they will be favored over other
less well-adapted features in other organisms and passed
on to future generations. From a Lamarckian perspective,
it makes much less sense to speak of "accidents and
hazards" as the driving force behind evolution. In this
view, an organism acquires new features not because
of blind chance, but because the organism’s ancestors
responded to their environment in a meaningful way (in
the case of the famous Lamarckian interpretation of the
giraffe’s long neck, the giraffe’s ancestors are claimed to
have stretched their neck to reach high leaves, passing on
this slightly longer neck to their offspring). It is likely,
then, that Jung was using the Darwinian concept of
natural selection as a starting point in the Neumann
letter. Jung, however, very distinctly linked this way of
thinking to synchronicity, arguing that the “accidents
and hazards” that account for evolution are meaningful,
giving rise to “syntheses which appear to us miraculous.”
Evolution as described here by Jung, then, is driven not
by blind chance, but by meaningful coincidences.
The hypothesis that this is what Jung had in
mind when he wrote his letter to Neumann is given
strong support when one examines the writings on
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evolutionary theory of Wolfgang Pauli, with whom Jung
collaborated intensively on his theory of synchronicity
and who held ideas about evolution that are virtually
identical to the ones put forward in the Neumann
letter. Unlike Jung, Pauli actually had a strong interest
in theories of evolution, the evidence for which can be
found in his letters. In the 1940s he became somewhat
obsessed with the topic, writing in 1944 to his friend and
fellow Nobel-prize winner Max Delbrück—who had by
then switched from physics to biology—that he was
reading with great interest the work of T. H. Huxley, and
that he had many questions for him about evolutionary
theory (Pauli, 1993, p. 212). In the early 1950s Pauli
continued with this research, the evidence for which is
again to be found in his letters. His biographer Charles
P. Enz quoted Pauli as writing the following in 1954 in
a letter to Delbrück:
"[I] became a bit more interested [in biology] than
in earlier times since last autumn. It started with
some remarks of Heisenberg . . . who found a rather
old Lamarckian book by A. Pauly still worth to be
read today. . . . Then I talked with O. Klein about
the matter, who told me about his friend Runnstrom
in Stockholm, who always attacks Darwinism, after
he had a couple of drinks and is then re-attacked by
others who had less drinks than he. (Which seems to
me rather characteristic.) Then Bohr's letter, which
you saw, arrived." This is followed by an impressive
list of recent biological publications that Pauli had
read. (Enz, 2002, p. 467)
In his public writings, Pauli did not comment
on this topic as freely as he did in his letters. He only
discussed it in one published article, "Ideas of the
Unconscious from the Standpoint of Natural Science
and Epistemology" (1954/1994), which he wrote for the
academic journal Dialectica and which Jung read with
great interest (see letter 67J, 10th of October 1955, in
Atom and Archetype, 2001, p. 131). In this article (which
deals with a host of other topics apart from evolutionary
theory) Pauli did not go into detail that much about
his views on evolutionary theory: he merely indicated
that he had misgivings about the worldview of NeoDarwinism, which according to him is very much a
product of the nineteenth century:
At present a theoretical model of biological evolution
seems to have found wide acceptance among
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bioligists; it is based on a combination of directionless
(random) mutations with “selection.” The latter,
taken over from Darwin, expresses the influence
on the environment. This model of evolution is an
attempt in line with the ideas of the second half of
the nineteenth century, to uphold theoretically the
complete elimination of all trace of teleology. The
latter must then be replaced in some way by the
introducing of “chance.” (Pauli, 1954/1994, pp. 161162)
In a 1954 letter to theoretical physicist Victor
Weisskopf Pauli even went as far as to call this outlook
the “chance religion of the biologists” (Gieser, 2005, p.
311). In the Dialectica article Pauli (1954/1994) did not
really offer an alternative point of view to this "chance
religion"—he merely criticized it for its over-reliance on
the concept of blind chance, writing that “the phenomena
before us, which are certainly highly complex, have not
as yet been analyzed and understood” (p. 162). In his
letters, however, Pauli went much more into detail. The
letter in which he gave the most elaborate exposition of
his own alternative point of view is one he sent to one
of Jung’s collaborators, Marie-Louise von Franz, on the
30th of October, 1953. To this letter he added an essay
entitled “The Piano Lesson,” which was not meant for
publication.8 After Pauli’s death, however, it was published
as part of the multi-volume series of books with Pauli’s
letters (1999, pp. 330-341); an English translation, as
well as an extensive commentary by the Dutch physicist
Herbert van Erkelens, was later published in the academic
journal for Jung scholarship, Harvest (Pauli, 1953/2002).
In this essay Pauli put forward ideas about evolutionary
theory that match very closely the ideas Jung described
in his letter to Neumann. Unlike Jung, however, Pauli
explicitly linked his ideas about the role of synchronicity
in evolution to Darwin’s concept of natural selection.
The evolutionary mechanism which he put forward in
the “The Piano Lesson” is basically Darwinian, resting
very clearly on natural selection. There is, however one
small—but highly important—difference in Pauli’s
account of how evolution works: the genetic mutations
that give rise to a new adaptation are not caused by a
process of random chance, but are meaningful. As Pauli
(1953/2002) put it in “The Piano Lesson”:
One has, therefore, the impression that the external
conditions on the one hand, and the genetic mutations
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leading to a proper adaptation on the other hand, are
not connected in a causal–reproducible way, but that
these mutations nevertheless emerged meaningfully
and purposefully as an indivisible whole together
with the outer circumstances. They correct the
"blind," random fluctuations of the mutations that
spring up. (p. 130)
And elsewhere in the same essay:
[This] assumes the correction of the random
fluctuations through meaningful and purposeful
coincidences that are not causally related. Although
in this way the first appearance of a biological
adaptation is not regarded as causal, it seems not
impossible, after what has been said before, to
understand the further hereditary survival of such a
gene mutation—once it has "succeeded"—through
models of a physical-chemical kind. (p. 130)
Natural selection, then, still has its role to play;
Pauli, however, added to this the idea of synchronicity
influencing the seemingly random mutations that lead to,
as Jung (1973b) put it in his Neumann letter, “syntheses
which seem to us miraculous” (pp. 494-495). In this
view, new mutations therefore do not just arise randomly;
rather, because of the influence of synchronicity, there is
a heightened chance that mutations will arise that will
somehow be meaningfully related to the environment.
As Pauli (1953/2002) put it in “The Piano Lesson”:
"mutations nevertheless [emerge] meaningfully and
purposefully as an indivisible whole together with the
outer circumstances” (p. 130).
But this is not the total picture of the
synchronistic view of evolution. As both Jung and
Pauli stated in their writings on the topic, apart from
the mutations and the outer circumstances, there is a
third factor involved in the evolutionary process, and it
is a factor which most definitely does not get taken into
account by Darwinian thinkers. The outer circumstances
and the new mutations are both physical factors; the
third factor which both Jung and Pauli refer to, however,
is what Pauli (1953/2002) referred to as a “psychic factor”
(p. 130). As he explained in “The Piano Lesson”: “In this
connection I would like to submit the further hypothesis
that this holistic occurrence of meaningful coincidences
in biological evolution points to a psychic factor which
goes hand in hand with them and which on a higher level
appears as emotionality or excitement” (p. 130).
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Jung mentioned this psychic factor in the second
fragment of his letter to Neumann, preferring instead to
use the term psychoid. In the Neumann letter he had this
to say on the topic:
The essential thing about [synchronistic] phenomena
is that an objective event coincides meaningfully
with a psychic process; that is to say, a physical event
and an endopsychic one have a common meaning.
This presupposes not only an all-pervading, latent
meaning which can be recognized by consciousness,
but, during that preconscious time, a psychoid
process with which a physical event meaningfully
coincides. (Jung, 1973b, pp. 494-495)
Jung used the term psychoid often in the
Collected Works, in reference to processes that behave in
psyche-like ways but do not take place in a context in
which consciousness plays any role. In On the Nature of
the Psyche, Jung defined it as follows: "The word simply
describes those processes in an organism that are quasipsychic, such as the reflex-process” (Jung, 1954, para.
368). According to Jung, such processes are present in
all organisms, even down to the simplest amoeba. In the
case of a worm, an example of such behavior would be
to come up to the surface when a sound resembling that
of rain drops hitting the surface can be heard. Even an
amoeba displays similarly so-called intelligent behavior,
despite the fact that it does not have a brain. Keeping
this basic idea in mind, it perhaps becomes clearer
what Jung (1973b) meant when he wrote to Neumann
that one needs to assume that, in pre-conscious times,
a “psychoid process with which a physical event
meaningfully coincides” (p. 494) existed. What Jung
(1931) had in mind here was in all likelihood what he
elsewhere called “the psychology of the worm, and even
of the amoeba” (para. 321): processes in living organisms
that are characterized by meaningful, goal-directed
behavior. For Jung, such processes could be found in all
living organisms, which means that for him, psyche is
not something that arises suddenly when human beings
arrive on the evolutionary stage—rather, psyche is a
spectrum, with lower and higher manifestations. Human
consciousness is simply a higher rung on the evolutionary
ladder, with a clear continuity existing to psyche-like, or
psychoid, phenomena in the animal world.
But what has all of this got to do with
synchronicity? Why did both Jung and Pauli feel
compelled to stress that a psychic (Pauli’s term) or psychoid
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(Jung’s term) factor played a role in evolution? The reason
for that is simple: because of the way both Jung and Pauli
came to define synchronicity, a psychic factor must be
involved, otherwise the phenomenon in question cannot
be a case of synchronicity. In the letter to Neumann, Jung
(1973b) briefly mentioned this definition, describing
synchronicity as a process in which “an objective event
coincides meaningfully with a psychic process; that is
to say, a physical event and an endopsychic one have a
common meaning” (p. 494) In order for something to
be an example of synchronicity, then, a psychic process
must be present. Jung is therefore obliged to conclude
that there must have been psychic events during the
entire evolutionary process, even at moments when there
were still no human beings; otherwise, it is impossible
that the “accidents and hazards” that drive evolution are
synchronistic. This, then, is the reason that Jung (1973b)
said that “a psychoid process with which a physical
event meaningfully coincides” (pp. 494-495) must have
existed. As this psychoid process will be meaningfully
related to the outer circumstances, the environment and
the new mutation are still connected, albeit indirectly.
This explains why Pauli (1953/2002) wrote in “The Piano
Lesson” that “these mutations nevertheless emerged
meaningfully and purposefully as an indivisible whole
together with the outer circumstances” (PAGE #?).
Conclusion
ere then is an outline of how Jung, and Pauli as
well, saw the relationship between synchronicity
and evolution. There appears to be more than enough
evidence to support the hypothesis that Jung and
Pauli held identical views on this topic, which means
that their respective ideas may reflect a single uniform
theory of evolution. But where in the current spectrum
of evolutionary theories should one place their shared
perspective? To begin with, it should be pointed out
that even though there are some similarities to both
Darwinism and Lamarckism, the theory as a whole is
different from both, something that Pauli (1953/2002)
acknowledged in “The Piano Lesson”:

H

According to this hypothesis, which differs from the
theories of Darwin as well of Lamarck, we encounter
here a third type of natural law. . .; it assumes the
correction of the random fluctuations through
meaningful and purposeful coincidences that are
not causally related (PAGE #?).
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Nevertheless, as Linda van Speybroeck correctly
pointed out in her article “Exploring Pauli’s (Quantum)
View on Science and Biology” (2009), this way of looking
at evolution does not attempt to refute Darwinism
altogether; rather, it seeks to “refine and/or extend it”
(PAGE #?). Natural selection still has a role to play—it is
only in their emphasis on the problematic nature of blind
chance that Pauli and Jung departed from the NeoDarwinists. Despite this shared usage of the concept of
natural selection, however, most Neo-Darwinian thinkers
would probably scoff at Jung and Pauli’s suggestion that
the mutations driving evolutionary change are not caused
by blind chance but by meaningful coincidences, with
most probably going as far as to state that this is a clear
example of a creationist way of thinking. It is certainly
true that certain creationist thinkers have put forward
ideas about evolution that seem to closely resemble what
Jung (1973b) stated in his letter to Neumann. At first
glance, there may not appear to be that much difference
between Jung’s statement that certain “syntheses
which appear to us miraculous” (PAGE #?) have been
created by a meaningful, acausal process, and, to name
but one example, creationist thinker Michael Behe’s
(1996) concept of irreducible complexity—his term
for evolutionary syntheses that are so complex that,
according to him, they cannot be explained by natural
selection. What separates Jung and Pauli from thinkers
like Behe, however, is that for them there is no ultimate,
inevitable end-goal to which all of evolution is directed;
rather, the chance mutations which drive evolution are
only meaningful in the environmental context of the
organism that gives rise to the new mutation. They are
not meaningful because an all-knowing creator is behind
them; rather, they are meaningful because they correlate
to the content of the psychoid process is operational in
the organism that gives birth to offspring with a new
meaningful mutation. Evolution for Jung and Pauli,
then, is meaningful, but not directed at pre-determined
ends. It makes somewhat more sense to compare their
perspective to that of several well-known authors who
theorize about evolution from the perspective of chaos
theory (sometimes referred to as complexity theory). In
this field, several thinkers have put forward views highly
similar to that of Jung and Pauli. It exceeds the scope
of the present paper to investigate these similarities
properly here—that is a paper topic onto itself, and in
the context of this paper I merely want to highlight that
there are some important similarities between the two
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perspectives, especially in their shared critical stance
towards the Neo-Darwinian notion of blind chance.
Stuart Kauffman, for example, who studies evolution
from a complexity perspective at the Santa Fe institute,
wrote that there “simply was not world enough and
time for chance to have created life as it exists today" (as
interviewed in Waldrop, 1992, p. 107). Waldrop (1992)
made a similar point, writing that:
To make a single protein molecule, for example,
you might have to chain together several hundred
amino-acid building blocks in a precise order. That’s
hard enough to do in a modern laboratory, where you
have access to all the latest tools of biotechnology. So
how could such a thing form all by itself in a pond?
Lots of people had tried to calculate the odds of that
happening, and their answers always came out pretty
much the same: if the formation were truly random,
you would have to wait far longer than the lifetime
of the universe to produce even one useful protein
molecule, much less all the myriads of proteins and
sugars and lipids and nucleic acids that you need to
make a fully functioning cell. (p. 122)
Similar views have been expressed by several
other well-known thinkers who wrote from the
perspective of chaos theory, for example Jantsch (1980),
Prigogine (1984), and Laszlo (1987). Their respective
evolutionary theories are different in the details, but they
all share as a common starting point the same critical
stance towards the reliance on blind chance of NeoDarwinism—a critical stance they share with Jung and
Pauli. The most widely read transpersonal author on
whom these evolutionary thinkers have had an influence
is, in all likelihood, Ken Wilber9, who theorizes about
evolution from a perspective that is very much informed
by the complexity thinkers mentioned above: Kauffman,
Jantsch, Prigogine, and Laszlo are all frequently
referenced and acknowledged as influences. It should
come as no surprise, then, that the view of evolution to
which Wilber has subscribed is highly similar to Jung and
Pauli’s as well. I do not want to claim here that the two
perspectives are identical—nevertheless there is a clear
pattern of overlap to be noted. As Jung, Wilber does not
see evolution as driven to meet predefined end-goals, in
the way certain creationist thinkers hold. Nevertheless,
he appears to be strongly of the opinion that evolution
is not random and meaningless, either. As he explained
in Sex, Ecology, Spirituality: “I think the answer these
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modern and mature disciplines give—namely, oops! (and
therefore, Don't ask!)—is about as infantile a response
as the human condition could possibly offer” (Wilber,
1995, p. 5). Putting it in the language of complexity
theory and making an explicit reference to the work of
Stuart Kauffman, he phrased the details of his objections
as follows:
I am not alone in seeing that chance and natural
selection by themselves are not enough to account
for the emergence that we see in evolution. Stuart
Kauffman and many others have criticized mere
chance and natural selection as not adequate to
account for this emergence (he sees the necessity of
adding self-organization). Of course I understand that
natural selection is not acting on mere randomness
or chance—because natural selection saves previous
selections, and this reduces dramatically the
probability that higher, adequate forms will emerge.
But even that is not enough, in my opinion, to
account for the remarkable emergence of some of
the extraordinarily complex forms that nature has
produced. (Wilber, 2007, n.p.)
Jung and Pauli, then, are nowadays joined by
a wide group of thinkers who have expressed similar
objections to neo-Darwinian thought. Some of these
modern critics have also been influential in the field
of transpersonal psychology, making this an as-yet
overlooked connection of similarity between Jung’s
thought and transpersonal psychology. That this
connection exists seems noteworthy, especially given the
fact that some thinkers in the transpersonal psychology
field have distanced themselves from Jung in recent years.
Somewhat ironically, one of the most influential writers
in this regard has been Ken Wilber, who has argued in
several publications that Jung falls victim to what Wilber
has called the pre-trans fallacy. Jung, according to Wilber
(1993), consistently confused pre-egoic levels of the psyche
(the archetypes) with the truly transpersonal dimensions of
reality. By equating spiritual experience with an experience of
the archetypes, which Wilber (1993) has defined as inherited
“collective forms” (p. 182), Jung—as Wilber has interpreted
him—reduced transpersonal experience to an experience of
innate biological factors. As he wrote in Grace and Grit:
Jung's major mistake, in my opinion, was to
confuse collective with transpersonal (or mystical).
Just because my mind inherits certain collective
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forms does not mean those forms are mystical or
transpersonal. We all collectively inherit ten toes, for
example, but if I experience my toes I am not having
a mystical experience (Wilber, 1993, p. 182).
Wilber completely overlooked, however, that
Jung went far beyond mere innate and biological factors
in his thinking about the concept of the archetype in the
final phase of his career.10 The ideas Jung put forward
in his writings about synchronicity reveal this with
particular clarity. The synchronicity phenomena, as Jung
concluded in the texts that deal with this concept, point
to the fact that psyche and matter are both reflections of
the same underlying transpersonal dimension. In On the
Nature of the Psyche he phrased this idea as follows:
Since psyche and matter are contained in one and
the same world, and moreover are in continuous
contact with one another and ultimately rest on
irrepresentable, transcendental factors, it is not
only possible but fairly probable, even, that psyche
and matter are two different aspects of one and the
same thing. The synchronicity phenomena point, it
seems to me, in this direction, for they show that
the nonpsychic can behave like the psychic, and vice
versa, without there being any causal connection
between them. Our present knowledge does not
allow us to do much more than compare the relation
of the psychic to the material world with two cones,
whose apices, meeting in a point without extension
—a real zero-point—touch and do not touch (Jung,
1954, para. 418).
Jung also used the term unus mundus for
this transpersonal dimension. According to him, it
is this “transcendental” (Jung’s term; 1952, para. 915)
dimension of underlying unity that gives rise to the
synchronicity phenomena, and is therefore also the
driving force behind the meaningful coincidences to
be found in the evolutionary process. The archetypes,
according to Jung, are what connects us to this unus
mundus. In my book The Innateness of Myth I describe
this connection as follows:
The archetype, according to Jung, is what links man
to this unus mundus. This is because the archetype has
a strange, dual nature: it is not only a psychological
structure, but because of its inherently biological
character it also has a non-psychic, material dimension.

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 71

... Because of this dual nature of the archetype
Jung felt that it is the aspect of our being which is
ontologically closest to the unus mundus. Jung thought
of the unus mundus as a coincidentia oppositorum,
to use the medieval philosopher Nicholas of Cusa’s
famous term. In the unus mundus the opposites come
together: psyche and non-psyche, spirit and matter.
According to Jung, this is also true of the archetype.
The archetype is therefore not only a bridge between
psyche and matter; it is also what connects man to the
underlying, transcendental principle which lies at the
root of the entire cosmos. (Rensma, 2010, p. 45).
Wilber appears to have overlooked the fact that
for Jung the archetypes are so important not just because
they are innate “collective forms” (Wilber, 1993, p.
182), but also because, in the final phase of his career,
he came to conclude that they are what connect us the
unus mundus—a dimension that is truly transpersonal,
as opposed to the merely innate and biological collective
unconscious. Archetypes, having been shaped by a
meaningful evolutionary process, are not merely random
remnants of mankind’s evolutionary history; rather, they
are also, as Anthony Stevens (2006) put it, “the product of
an objective order which transcends both the human mind
and the external world” (p. 88). Wilber may not be aware
of the exact details of this final phase of Jung’s intellectual
development, and may therefore have drawn premature
conclusions as to Jung’s relevance for transpersonal
psychology. It is my hope that the information presented
in this paper has enabled the reader to make a more
careful judgment as to the nature of Jung’s exact position.

4. Dialectica 8, No. 4 (15 December 1954), pp. 283–
303. Published in an English translation as “Ideas
of the Unconscious from the Standpoint of Natural
Science and Epistemology” in Writings on Physics
and Philosophy (Pauli, 1954/1994).
5. For a more detailed discussion of Jung’s general ideas
about synchronicity I strongly recommend Roderick
Main’s (2004) excellent work, The Rupture of Time:
Synchronicity and Jung’s Critique of Modern Western
Culture.
6. For an overview of the key issues related to Jung’s
views on evolution and its link to the concept of
the collective unconscious, see my articles Analytical
Psychology and the Ghost of Lamarck (Rensma, 2013).
7. See for example his essay “Analytical Psychology
and ‘Weltanschauung’” in Collected Works, volume 8
(1927/1931, para. 695).
8. For more information about the context in which
Pauli wrote this essay see the excellent biography
of his life by C. P. Enz (2002), No Time to be Brief,
which contains an entire chapter about it.
9. Wilber himself has stopped referring to his own
work as transpersonal—and has indicated preference
for the term integral. For a good overview of the
reasons why Wilber has stopped using the term,
transpersonal, for his work, see Howard (2005, p.
184).
10. For an overview of what appear to be the main
phases in Jung’s development of the concept of
the archetype, see my book, The Innateness of Myth
(Rensma, 2010), chapter two. The final phase as
I define it in this book is the synchronicity phase,
which lasts from 1951 to the end of Jung’s life.
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